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Maryland's "Some Single Work, Object Or Purpose"
Clause: Keystone Of The Power Of The
Executive Branch Over Appropriations
Panitz v. Comptroller1
Ferguson v. Goldstein'
Appropriation bills are a subject which generates little excitement
except in those directly concerned with their drafting and passage.
For the most part they are technical pieces of legislation, barely com-
prehensible to the layman. However, such legislation is extremely im-
portant for one very simple reason - it is the means by which the
state expends public funds.
In Maryland, the subject of appropriation bills is thoroughly
regulated by the state Constitution. The budgetary process in Mary-
land is governed by Sections 32 and 52 of Article III of the Constitu-
tion. The history of the appropriation process in Maryland prior
to the enactment of Section 52 shows clearly that the introduction
of that section was intended to delegate to the executive the primary
1. 247 Md. 501, 232 A.2d 891 (1967).
2. No. 23196 (Cir. Ct., Montgomery Co., July 9, 1968).
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responsibility for planning the fiscal policies of the state.' In this
respect, Maryland may be characterized as a "strong executive" state."
Under Article III, Section 32, no money may be drawn from the
treasury except by an appropriation. Under Article III, Section 52 (2),
"Every appropriation bill shall be either a Budget Bill, or a Supple-
mentary Appropriation Bill. . . ."' Section 52 of Article III provides
for an executive budget plan whereby the Governor is required to
submit a complete plan of proposed expenditures and estimated reve-
nues (the budget), along with a bill for all proposed appropriations
of the budget (the budget bill). The General Assembly cannot increase
any of the items in the budget bill, other than those for the judiciary
and the General Assembly, but it can strike out or reduce items con-
tained therein, except those for the state debt, for public schools, for
payment of certain salaries, and for the judiciary.6 The budget bill
apparently must comply with the general "one subject" provision of
the Maryland Constitution, which is applicable to all state legislation.'
Accordingly, every budget bill must "embrace but one subject, which
must be described in its title. .... 8
3. INTERIM REPORT O THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMISSION, MARY-
LAND 155 (1967):
The central purpose of the "budget amendment" was to impose upon the governor
the primary responsibility for controlling the fiscal policies and operation of the
State and on the General Assembly the secondary task of reviewing the gover-
nor's proposals and eliminating unnecessary or excessive items. The General
Assembly was allowed the initiative in passing supplemental appropriation bills
only after the governor's budget had been acted upon and on condition that each
supplemental appropriation bill be limited to a single purpose ...
Brief for Appellants at 25, Panitz v. Comptroller, 247 Md. 501, 232 A.2d 891 (1967)
"The executive budget system was designed to fix upon the executive the responsibility
for preparation and presentation of a unified fiscal plan in which the State's financial
situation might be looked at as a whole and appropriate priorities established."
4. Hughes v. Maryland Comm. for Fair Rep., 241 Md. 471, 513, 217 A.2d 273,
298 (1966) (dissenting opinion) :
These constitutional provisions and the various statutes implementing the
formulation of the State budget and fiscal policy by the Governor give him a
dominant position in the fiscal policy of the State not usually enjoyed by the Chief
Executive of a State, but more usually performed by the legislature itself.
A. BucK, BUDGEr MAKING 7 (1921):[The] budget-making authorities of states and cities may be classified under
three general types, namely, (1) the executive type, when the chief executive
officer is responsible for the formulation of the budget; (2) the board type, when
a group of administrative, or administrative and legislative, officers is responsible
for the presentation of the budget; and (3) the legislative type, where the legis-
lative body, through one of its committees or agents, formulates the budget.
5. This provision formed the basis for the decision in Ferguson v. Goldstein,
No. 23196 at 4 (Cir. Ct., Montgomery Co., July 9, 1968) :
If it had been the intent of the drafters of Section 52 (and the People of Maryland
in adopting it) to carve out a third type of appropriation, namely, an "emergency
appropriation bill," and to except it from the strictures of subsection (8), it
would have been very simple and easy to do so. Such a result may not fairly be
drawn from what we regard as the plain and unequivocal language of Section 52.
6. McKeldin v. Steedman, 203 Md. 89, 98, 98 A.2d 561, 564 (1953):
Items proposed by the Governor in his Budget Bill may be reduced or eliminated
by the legislature, but no new item may be introduced by amendment to the
Budget Bill; only a Supplementary Budget Bill is permitted to be used for this
purpose and it must provide a tax to raise the necessary revenue.
7. MD. CONST. art. III, § 29: "[E]very law shall embrace but one subject which
must be described in its title...
8. Id.
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Supplementary appropriation bills are initiated by the legislature
itself to provide funds for purposes not included in the budget bill.
These bills are limited by the Maryland Constitution "to some single
work, object or purpose therein stated. . .. "' This constitutional
limitation, an integral part of the budget scheme, is designed as a
further safeguard to prevent the legislature from encroaching upon
the executive initiative in budgetary affairs, while at the same time
permitting enactment of necessary additional appropriations not pro-
vided for in the "complete plan" budget :10 "The 'separate bill' and
'single purpose' provisions were obviously intended better to illuminate
the whole process of legislative initiative in the appropriation field (the
inherent evils of which were well-known) and to enable the Executive
more effectively to exercise his veto powers under Article II, Section
17, of the Constitution.""
In addition to the budget bill and the supplementary appropria-
tion bill, Article III, Section 52 provides a third method of appropria-
tion, the "emergency appropriation," which may be enacted at a special
session of the Maryland General Assembly convened by the Governor. 12
The budgetary process outlined in Article III, Section 52, was
adopted in 1916 by an amendment to the state Constitution.'" The
amendment was drafted by a special commission formed to overhaul
the state's funding mechanism.'4 Prior to the adoption of the budget
amendment, the appropriation process was almost entirely a legislative
function; the budget amendment provided for the first time a mechanism
by which the state executive could effectively project the fiscal require-
ments of the state. The practice under the previous system was
hardly conducive to the establishment of responsible fiscal policies;
because of logrolling and pork-barrel legislative practices, the state
often found itself faced with deficits.'" The budget amendment was
9. MD. CONST. art. III, § 52(8) (a) (emphasis added).
10. Brief for Appellants at 13, Panitz v. Comptroller, 247 Md. 501, 232 A.2d
891 (1967):
Just as the constitutional and statutory requirements for a "complete plan" are
designed to insure that the goals of an executive budget system are not undermined
by supplemental budgets, so the requirement that supplementary appropriation
bills embrace only one work or subject, is designed to prevent the plan of the
budget system from being undermined by such bills. The purpose of the restric-
tion on supplementary appropriation bills, as other states have recognized, is not
merely to guard against legislative log-rolling, but also to guard against fragmen-
tation of the governor's fiscal program and resulting dilution of responsibility.
11. Ferguson v. Goldstein, No. 23196 at 3 (Cir. Ct., Montgomery Co., July 9,
1968).
12. MD. CONST. art. III, § 52(14).
13. H. MILES, THE MARYLAND ExEcuTIvE BUDGET SYSTEM 7 (1942): "The
present State Constitutional Budget System was established ...through an Amend-
ment to the State Constitution proposed by Chapter 159 of the Acts of the General
Assembly of Maryland of 1916. The Amendment was ratified by the voters of the
State on November 7th, 1916 ....
14. Id.: "The Budget Amendment was drafted by a special commission appointed
by the Democratic State Convention held in Baltimore in September, 1915. The
Commission ...was headed by the late Dr. Frank J. Goodnow, President of Johns
Hopkins University."
15. See generally McKeldin v. Steedman, 203 Md. 89, 98 A.2d 561 (1953);
H. FLAcK, THE MARYLAND BUDGET AMENDMENT (1947); REPORT 01 THE GoODNOW
COMMISSION (1916) (reprinted in The Journal of Proceedings of the Senate of Mary-
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designed to minimize the possibility of such deficits by placing the
budgetary initiative in the hands of the executive and by limiting the
ability of the legislature to encroach upon that initiative. The latter
purpose is accomplished by the "single work, object or purpose" clause.
Maryland is one of twenty-one states which include in their con-
stitutions provisions limiting the scope of supplementary appropria-
tion bills to some single subject or object.1" Those states which do
not have such provisions apply to supplementary appropriation bills
the "general one-subject" clause, which is applicable to all state legis-
lation and which is a part of almost every state constitution.'7 Under
the general provisions, courts have indicated a willingness to liberally
construe the requirement of one subject; where the court can see that
the legislation has reference to one general topic which is capable of
treatment as a unit, the constitutional requirement is usually deemed
to have been satisfied.' 8 While the general one-subject provision of
the Maryland Constitution has been the subject of extensive litigation,
as have those of most other states,' 9 in relatively few instances has an
act been declared invalid because it embraced more than one subject.20
The "single work, object or purpose" provision has as one of its
purposes the prevention of what is commonly referred to as "logrolling"
and "pork-barrel" legislation. 2' Where entire discretion for initiation
of appropriation measures is centered in the legislature, such practices
are prevalent. 2 Members of the legislature, in their desire to insure
land for the Legislative Session of 1916); H. MILES, THE MARYLAND EXECUTIVE
BUDGEr SYSTEM 9 (1942):
The old method often witnessed "logrolling" or "you help me and I'll help you"
tactics among many of the members of the Legislature in their efforts to insure
passage of the particular appropriations in which they had some selfish or political
interest. It was not unusual for excessive appropriations to result from such
tactics and also from the pressure of political and professional lobbyists; and,
almost as frequently, some of the most important activities or needs of the State
were either overlooked or sadly neglected in what was commonly termed, the
"Pork Barrel" scramble.
16. ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 71; ARiz. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 20; ARK. CoNST.
art. V, § 30; CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 34; COLO. CONST. art. V, § 32; FLA. CONST.
art. III, § 30; GA. CONST. art. III, § 7; ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 16; LA. CoNsT.
art. IV, § 9; MD. CoNsT. art. III, § 52; MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 69; MONT. CONST.
art. V, § 33; NEB. CONST. art. III, § 22; N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 16; N.D. CONST.
art. III, § 62; OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 56; ORE. CONST. art. IX, § 7; PA. CONST.
art. III, § 15; S.D. CoNST. art. XII, § 2; W. VA. CoNsT. art. VI, § 51; Wvo. CoNST.
art. III, § 34.
17. See Rudd, No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject, 42 MINN. L.
Rtv. 389 (1958).
18. See Merrill, Legislation: Subject, Title and Amendment, 13 NEB. L. BULL.
95 (1935).
19. E.g., Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151 (1854) ; Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 184 (1859).
See generally Everstine, Titles of Legislative Acts, 9 MD. L. REv. 196 (1948) ; Merrill,
Legislation: Subject, Title and Amendment, 13 NEB. L. BULL. 95 (1935); Rudd, No
Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject, 42 MINN. L. REv. 389 (1958); Comment,
State Statutes: Constitutional Subject - Title and Amendatory Requirements, 24
U. CH L. Rsv. 722 (1957).
20. See Everstine, Titles of Legislative Acts, 9 MD. L. Rlv. 196, 212 (1948).
21. See note 15 supra and accompanying text. See also Cottrell v. Faubus, 233
Ark. 721, 347 S.W.2d 52 (1961).
22. See note 15 supra and accompanying text. See also McKeldin v. Steedman,
203 Md. 89, 98 A.2d 561 (1953) ; Dorsey v. Petrott, 178 Md. 230, 13 A.2d 630 (1940);
Mayor & City Council v. O'Connor, 147 Md. 639, 128 A. 759 (1925).
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passage of measures which are of special concern to their own con-
stituents, often overlook or disregard the fiscal realities of the state
as a whole. To insure passage of bills that would doubtless fail of
passage on their own merits, such measures are "tacked" onto appro-
priation bills even though they clearly have no connection with the
appropriation under consideration.2" Such practices are even more
deleterious in effect when each of several members agree to vote for
the others' measures. In this manner any number of "riders" can be
attached to an appropriation bill and be assured of passage. 4
The "single work, object or purpose" limitation on supplementary
appropriation bills has other advantages. Since an appropriation bill
by its very nature would seem to be concerned with the appropriation
of money, legislators should not have to be concerned with provisions
in such bills relating to extraneous matters; if freed from outside
considerations, legislators will be able to devote their energies to con-
sidering the merits of the appropriation itself.25 If a supplementary
appropriation bill is merely what its name imports, legislators should
not be expected to search each bill for subjects other than the setting
aside of moneys for a specified purpose.2 6 Thus, "single subject"
provisions are designed to protect the state treasury from legislative
raids accomplished by the insertion into appropriation bills of matters
which might pass unnoticed, 2 and to assure the public that the atten-
tion of the legislature will not be diverted from the important matter
of appropriations by the inclusion of other matters. 8
Panita AND Ferguson
In Panitz v. Comptroller,29 the Maryland Court of Appeals, inter-
preting the "single work, object or purpose" clause for the first time,
held that the Cooper-Hughes Act,"° a supplementary appropriation
bill, was a violation of that clause. The Cooper-Hughes Act contem-
plated an increase in the state income tax and the appropriation of
part of the expected increase in revenue for a state police fund, for
teachers' salaries and pensions, for school construction and aid pro-
grams, and for outright grants to political subdivisions. The formula
generally used for distribution of the funds differed greatly in its im-
pact on the subdivisions. As pointed out by the court ". . . the vari-
23. See Sellers v. Frohmiller, 42 Ariz. 239, 24 P.2d 666 (1933) ; Davis v. State,
7 Md. 151 (1854) ; State ex rel. Whittier v. Safford, 28 N.M. 531, 214 P. 759 (1923) ;
State ex rel. Lucero v. Marron, 17 N.M. 304, 128 P. 485 (1912); Commonwealth
ex rel. Greene v. Gregg, 161 Pa. 582, 29 A. 297 (1894).
24. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Greene v. Gregg, 161 Pa. 582, 29 A. 297
(1894).
25. See, e.g., Sellers v. Frohmiller, 42 Ariz. 239, 24 P.2d 666 (1933).
26. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hueller v. Thompson, 316 Mo. 272, 289 S.W. 338
(1926).
27. See State ex rel. Whittier v. Safford, 28 N.M. 531, 214 P. 759 (1923).
28. See Lee v. Dowda, 155 Fla. 68, 19 So. 2d 570 (1944).
29. 247 Md. 501, 232 A.2d 891 (1967). The Court of Appeals issued a per curiam
order on June 14, 1967 and filed its formal opinion on Sept. 13, 1967.
30. Ch. 142, [1967] Md. Laws 152.
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ances in the grants suggest that the typical opportunities for 'logrolling'
and 'back scratching' were present and significant.
While Panitz held that the act was invalid as a supplementary
appropriation bill, it also indicated that it was prima facie valid as
legislation, and suggested that the General Assembly, at a special
session, could validly make appropriations from the increased revenue
to carry out the several works, objects and purposes of the act.3 2 The
effect of the decision in Panitz was, then, to require the General
Assembly to adhere to certain constitutional procedural requirements,
but ostensibly not to prevent the legislature from carrying out its
desired purposes in another manner.38
Following the suggestion of the court in Panitz,"4 the Governor
convened a special session of the General Assembly, at which the pro-
visions of the Cooper-Hughes bill were enacted as an emergency
appropriation. 5 However, the General Assembly was not to have the
last word on the subject, for in Ferguson v. Goldstein,6 the Circuit
Court for Montgomery County declared the emergency appropriation
invalid as violative of the "single work, object or purpose" provision.
The court based its decision on the conclusion that an emergency
appropriation bill is itself a supplementary appropriation bill and, there-
fore, is subject to the "single work, object or purpose" requirement.
Because Section 52(2) mentions only two types of appropriation bills,
the budget bill and the supplementary appropriation bill, the court
31. 247 Md. at 510, 232 A.2d at 896. Under the formula for allocation of the
police protection funds, Queen Anne's County, with about 2% of the population of
Baltimore City, received less than one-third of 1% of the allocation to Baltimore
City for such purpose. Under the formula for allocation of funds for school building
construction, Baltimore City received about 12% of the total funds, Queen Anne's
County received about 2% of the Baltimore City allocation, and Calvert County, with
a smaller population than Queen Anne's County, received more than 5% of the
Baltimore City allocation. Id. at 510, 232 A.2d at 896. See also Brief for Appellants
at 15-16, Panitz v. Comptroller, 247 Md. 501, 232 A.2d 891 (1967).
32. In its per curiam order the Court of Appeals stated:
That the General Assembly of Maryland, at a Special Session, can validly and
effectively make appropriations from as much of the revenues to accrue to the
State for the ensuing fiscal year by virtue of the said Chapter 142 [the Cooper-
Hughes Act] as have not already been appropriated by Chapter 199 of the Laws
of 1967 (The Budget Bill) in order to permit the effectuation of the several works,
objects and purposes of said Chapter 142 as therein set forth and specified.
247 Md. at 503, 232 A.2d at 892.
33. Brief for Appellants at 22-23, Panitz v. Comptroller, 247 Md. 501, 232 A.2d
891 (1967) :
[(1) The] General Assembly could have initiated such measures on its own
motion by way of a revenue bill and general law, which could have moved ahead
of the budget bill, enabling the Governor to put the necessary appropriations in
a supplemental budget as contingent appropriations; 2) the General Assembly
could have passed the appropriations as separate supplementary appropriations
bills, including in each a graduated income tax sufficient to pay the appropriation
contained in the bill, together with a provision that the tax be cumulative with
other graduated taxes enacted at the legislative session; 3) the matter could
have been (and still can be) dealt with at an extraordinary session of the
General Assembly, as an emergency appropriation, free of the single purpose
restriction by reason of the exemption in Article III, § 52(14).
The Ferguson decision obviated alternative number three. See note 36 infra and
accompanying text.
34. Note 32 supra.
35. Act of June 22, 1967, ch. 1 [1967 Special Session] Md. Laws 5.
36. No. 23196 (Cir. Ct., Montgomery Co., July 9, 1968).
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reasoned, an emergency appropriation, obviously not part of the
budget, must be a supplementary appropriation bill. The Ferguson
court refused to let the legislature circumvent the constitutional limits
placed on appropriation bills initiated by the legislature simply by
enacting an otherwise invalid bill at a special session.
COURT INTERPRETATION OF SIMILAR PROVISIONS
IN OTHER STATE CONSTITUTIONS
There are essentially four different types of limiting clauses en-
countered in the constitutions of the twenty-one states which have
provisions restricting the contents of supplementary appropriation
billsY One type is the "single work, object or purpose" clause con-
tained in the Maryland Constitution. The second, and most common
type of provision limits the general appropriation bill to appropriations
for the expenses of the departments of the state, for interest on the
public debt, and for public schools, with the further requirement that
all other bills making appropriations embrace but one subject or
object." Most of the cases decided under this type of provision have
been concerned with the permissible contents of the general appropria-
tion bill, rather than "other" appropriation bills which must be limited
to one subject or object."9 Apparently, when construing general appro-
priation bills under this type of provision, there is less left to judicial
construction than when the court is called upon to construe a supple-
mentary appropriation bill. The terms of the constitutional provision
37. See note 16 supra.
38. States with such a provision are: Ala., Ariz., Ark., Colo., Ga., La., Miss.,
Mont., N.M., N.D., Okla., Pa., S.D., and Wyo. For citations, see note 16 supra.
E.g., MONT. CONST. art. V, § 33: "The general appropriation bills shall embrace
nothing but appropriations for the ordinary expenses of the legislative, executive andjudicial departments of the state, interest on the public debt and for public schools. All
other appropriations shall be made by separate bills, each embracing but one subject."
The New Mexico Constitution also contains the following provision: "Every law
making an appropriation shall distinctly specify the sum appropriated and the object
to which it is to be applied." N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 30.
39. In Sellers v. Frohmiller, 42 Ariz. 239, 24 P.2d 666 (1933), the general appro-
priation bill in one section provided for the position of secretary to the governor and
in another section appropriated a salary for the position. The Arizona Constitution
limits the general appropriation bill to appropriations for the different departments of
the state, for state institutions, for public schools, and for interest on the public debt.
ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 20. The court remarked that provisions which are
incidental to or explanatory of a particular appropriation may be included in the
general appropriation bill; however, the court held that the bill violated the consti-
tutional requirement, because the appropriation was merely incidental to the legislation
it was intended to carry out - the appointment of a secretary to the governor.
See also State v. Angle, 54 Ariz. 13, 91 P.2d 705 (1939). Where the act before the
court is a general appropriation bill, there are several questions that may have to be
decided by the court. Once again it becomes largely a problem of legislative con-
struction, for the courts may be called upon to determine what the framers meant by
"ordinary expenses", "current expenses of state institutions", and of what the various
branches of the government consist. See, e.g., State ex rel. Lucero v. Marron, 17 N.M.
304, 128 P. 485 (1912) ; State ex rel. Oster v. Jorgenson, 81 S.D. 447, 136 N.W.2d
870 (1965). For the purposes of this Note the legislative construction accorded these
terms is important only insofar as it indicates a tendency on the part of the courts to
construe, either narrowly or broadly, the permissible contents of appropriation bills.
The courts seemingly apply to general appropriation bills the same tests of "germane"
and "incidental" provisions as have been applied to special appropriation bills.
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limit the permissible subjects of a general appropriation bill; the only
issue is whether a given provision in such a bill is "incidental" to these
permissible subjects. All "other" appropriation bills must be considered
on their own merits, without the narrow topical restrictions placed upon
the general appropriation bill, but with all the uncertainties accompany-
ing a determination of what constitutes one subject or object.
The third type of provision applicable to appropriation bills states
that bills appropriating money for certain enumerated purposes shall
not contain provisions on any other subject.4" These specific "pur-
poses" include "salaries of public officers and other current expenses
of the state,"'" pay of members of the legislature and "salaries of the
government."42 While this third type of provision does not contain
a requirement that all other appropriation bills must embrace but
one subject, this does not mean that bills making appropriations for
other purposes may contain a plurality of subjects. Appropriation bills
for other purposes must at least satisfy the general one-subject require-
ment. Under this third type of provision it has been held that an act
appropriating money for the salaries of officers of the state cannot
contain appropriations for any other purpose.4 3 In Fergus v. Russell,
4
an act providing for the ordinary expenses of the state government
also contained an appropriation for the payment of the salaries of state
officers. The contention was made that the phrase "shall contain no
provisions on any other subject" in the constitutional provision was
to be interpreted as "shall contain no provisions on any subject other
than appropriations," thus permitting the inclusion in a general appro-
priation bill of provisions for the salaries of officers of the state
government. The court rejected this contention:
The language employed in this section is plain and unmistakable,
and was clearly intended to prevent the making of appropria-
tions for the pay of salaries of officers of the state government
in any bill which should contain a provision on any other subject
than that of appropriations for the pay of members and officers
of the General Assembly and for salaries of officers of the
state government.40
While under the second type of provision a supplementary appro-
priation bill can establish a bureau, office or commission, and appro-
40. States with such provisions are: Fla., Ill., Neb., and Ore. For citations, see
note 16 supra. See, e.g., ORE. CONST. art. IX, § 7: "Laws making appropriations
for the salaries of public officers and other current expenses of the state shall contain
provisions upon no other subject." The Illinois and Nebraska constitutions employ
slightly different terms than the Florida and Oregon constitutions. ILL. CONST.
art. IV, § 16: "Bills making appropriations for the pay of members and officers of
the general assembly, and for the salaries of the government, shall contain no pro-
visions on any other subject."
41. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 30; ORE. CONST. art. IX, § 7.
42. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 16; NEB. CoNsT. art. III, § 22.
43. Fergus v. Russell, 270 Ill. 304, 110 N.E. 130 (1915).
44. 270 Ill. 304, 110 N.E. 130 (1915).
45. 110 N.E. at 137. See also Lee v. Dowda, 155 Fla. 68, 19 So. 2d 570 (1944);
Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454 (1895) ; State ex rel Whittier v. Safford,
28 N.M. 531, 214 P. 759 (1923) ; State ex rel. Lucero v. Marron, 17 N.M. 304, 128
P. 485 (1912).
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priate funds therefor,46 under the third type of provision this has not
always been permissible. 7 If, however, under the third type of pro-
vision, the appropriation is for a purpose other than one of those
specified, the courts have interpreted auxiliary provisions as being
merely incidental and, therefore, properly included." In Winter v.
Barrett,49 an act imposed a tax upon persons engaged in the retail
sale of tangible personal property, provided how the money was to be
used and made appropriations from the anticipated revenue. These
facts are strikingly similar to those involved in Panits; however, the
Illinois court in Winter held that the single "subject" of the act was
the tax:
As we have stated, the matter of providing how the money
collected from the tax shall be used is clearly related to the
subject of imposing and collecting the tax, and making appro-
priations from the anticipated revenue arising from the tax must
also be considered a matter so closely related to the general subject-
matter of the act as not to constitute a separate subject within
the meaning of the Constitution.5"
The court in Winter did not decide, as did the Maryland Court of
Appeals in Panitz, that the purposes for which the money was to be
used constituted a plurality of subjects or objects. It is important to
note, however, that Winter was decided under the Illinois general one-
subject provision." Since the purpose of the bill was not one of those
enumerated in the provision applicable to appropriation bills, its subject
was governed by the general one-subject provision, and the court
followed the usual pattern of broadly construing such a provision.52
The most restrictive provision, at least on its face, is that found
in the California Constitution. Bills appropriating money, other than
the general appropriation bill, must contain only one item of appro-
priation, and that for one single and certain purpose. Notwithstanding
this strict requirement, the California courts have not always agreed
as to when an appropriation bill violates this provision.54 In Murray
v. Colgan 5 an act, entitled "An act to encourage the cultivation of
ramie in the State of California; to provide a bounty for ramie fiber,
and to make an appropriation therefor to appoint a state superin-
tendent of ramie culture, and make an appropriation for his salary,"
was held to contain two distinct items of appropriation and was there-
46. Hill v. Rae, 52 Mont. 378, 158 P. 826 (1916); State ex rel. Gaulke v. Turner,
37 N.D. 635, 164 N.W. 924 (1917).
47. E.g., Matthews v. People, 202 Ill. 389. 67 N.E. 28 (1903).
48. E.g., Winter v. Barrett, 352 Ill. 441, 186 N.E. 113 (1933).
49. 352 Ill. 441, 186 N.E. 113 (1933).
50. 186 N.E. at 121 (emphasis added).
51. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13.
52. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
53. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 34, reads, in part: "No bill making an appropriation
of money, except the Budget Bill, shall contain more than one item of appropriation,
and that for one single and certain purpose to be therein expressed."
54. Compare Los Angeles v. Post War Public Works Review Bd., 26 Cal. 2d 101,
156 P.2d 746 (1945), with Sullivan v. Gage, 145 Cal. 759, 79 P. 537 (1905).
55. 94 Cal. 435, 29 P. 871 (1892).
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fore declared invalid.56 Even though the two appropriations involved
served the same purpose, viz. the encouragement of ramie cultivation,
the court literally applied the meaning of the constitutional provision
and invalidated the act. Because there was more than one item of
appropriation, the court felt compelled to declare the act unconstitu-
tional. However, in Los Angeles v. Post War Public Works Review
Board,5" the California provision was more liberally construed. The
act in question involved an appropriation of ten million dollars for
relief of post-war unemployment through a program of public works
engaged in by cities and counties. Part of the money appropriated
was to be spent for planning, another part for administration, and
still another part for the acquisition of sites. Taking the position that
the details of expending the money appropriated were so related and
incidental to the single purpose of the appropriation as not to violate
the constitutional proscription, the court held that the act contained
but one item of appropriation, and that for a single purpose.5" Thus,
even though the California constitutional provision relating to supple-
mentary appropriations is similar in many respects to that of Mary-
land,59 the California courts have apparently adopted a more liberal
construction of the "one item" provision and now permit the legisla-
ture to play a more prominent role in the initiation of appropriations.6"
Although the courts superficially are in agreement as to the pur-
poses to be served by one-subject provisions,61 they are clearly not
unanimous as to what in fact constitutes a violation of such a pro-
vision. Disagreement is most noticeable in the different definitions
applied to the constitutional terms. "Subject" and "object" have
received varying interpretations by the courts.6" Courts have com-
monly interpreted the terms "subject" and "object" as synonymous;"
56. 29 P. at 872.
57. 26 Cal. 2d 101, 156 P.2d 746 (1945).
58. See also State ex rel. Whittier v. Safford, 28 N.M. 531, 214 P. 759 (1923).
In Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Marquardt, 59 Cal. 2d 159, 379 P.2d 28, 28 Cal. Rptr.
724 (1963), the view was adopted that the same principles of singleness of subject
apply to the general one-subject provision as to the special appropriation provision.
59. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 34:
The Governor shall, at each regular session of the Legislature, submit to the
Legislature, with an explanatory message, a budget containing a complete plan
and itemized statement of all proposed expenditures . . . and of all estimated
revenues.
The budget shall be accompanied by an appropriation bill covering the pro-
posed expenditures, to be known as the Budget Bill .... Until the Budget Bill
has been finally enacted, neither house shall place upon final passage any other
appropriation bill, except emergency bills recommended by the Governor, or appro-
priations for the salaries, mileage and expenses of the Senate and Assembly.
60. Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Marquardt, 59 Cal. 2d 159, 379 P.2d 28, 35, 28
Cal. Rptr. 724, 730 (1963):
Where a statute sets up a number of special funds for a single purpose, or
there are a number of allocations of money from different funds for that one
purpose, the allocations, considered together, should be treated as being only "one
item of appropriation." [The cases of Sullivan v. Gage, 145 Cal. 759, 79 P. 537(1905) and Murray v. Colger, 94 Cal. 434, 29 P. 871 (1892)] ... are disapproved
insofar as they may be inconsistent with the conclusions we have reached.
61. See notes 27-28 supra and accompanying text.
62. Compare State ex rel. Jensen v. Kelly, 65 S.D. 345, 274 N.W. 319 (1937),
with State ex rel. Lucero v. Marron, 17 N.M. 304, 128 P. 485 (1912).
63. See Rudd, No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject, 42 MINN. L.
Rv. 389 (1958).
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indeed, this interpretation seems reasonable in the context in which
the terms have been considered. For the most part, this interpretation
has been applied in cases construing general one-subject provisions.
A more precise analysis of the two terms was provided by an Alabama
court: "The 'object' of a law is the aim or purpose of the enact-
ment. . . . The 'subject' of a law is the matter to which it relates
and with which it deals." '64 Thus, there is an apparent difference in
the requirement of "one subject" and "one object" if a strict reading
of the terms is followed.65 However, no clear differentiation has been
made by the courts.6 6
In states with only a general one-subject provision, the question
of whether a supplementary appropriation bill contains more than one
subject will be tested by the same criteria as would any other legis-
lation." Such states usually apply a liberal interpretation of the one-
subject requirement, with a consequent broad reading of "subject"
to include anything which reasonably has reference to the general
topic of the bill.6" An interesting problem arises, however, in those
states which have both a general one-subject provision and a pro-
vision specifically applicable only to supplementary appropriation bills.
In such states two possible results may obtain; the liberal construction
universally accorded the general one-subject provision may be carried
over to the provision relating to supplementary appropriation bills, or
a more restricted meaning may be applied to the latter provision. As
a practical matter, which construction prevails seems to depend largely
on whether the same terms are used in both provisions. 69 In those
states which employ the word "subject" in both provisions, a broad
meaning is given to the term in both provisions; if a bill does not
violate the general one-subject provision, it cannot violate the pro-
vision applicable to supplementary appropriation bills.7" This reason-
ing, however, has an obvious flaw. The mere fact that there are two
separate provisions would indicate that the two provisions were in-
64. State v. Ferguson, 104 Ala. 249, 28 So. 917, 918 (1900). See also State ex rel.
Jensen v. Kelly, 65 S.D. 345, 274 N.W. 319 (1937).
65. Rudd, No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject, 42 MINN. L. Rrv.
389 (1958).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See Merrill, Legislation: Subject, Title and Amendment, 13 NEB. L. BuIL.
95 (1935).
69. Compare Constitutional Defense League v. Waters, 309 Pa. 545, 164 A. 613
(1933), with State ex rel. Jensen v. Kelly, 65 S.D. 345, 274 N.W. 319 (1937). In
Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454 (1895), the court reached the conclusion
that both Sections 16 and 13 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution, the special and
general one-subject provisions, respectively, were to be given the same meaning because
the word "subject" is used in both provisions. Similarly, in Opinion of the Justices,
275 Ala. 254, 154 So. 2d 12 (1963), where both provisions of the Alabama Constitution
used the word "subject," the court concluded that the requirement of the two pro-
visions were the same, and stated that "[iut is clear therefore that if a separate bill
meets the broader requirements of [the general one-subject provision] . . . it, of
necessity, will satisfy the requirements of [the supplementary appropriation pro-
vision]. . . ." 154 So. 2d at 15. See also Constitutional Defense League v. Waters,
309 Pa. 545, 164 A. 613 (1933) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Greene v. Gregg, 161 Pa. 582,
29 A. 297 (1894). But see Cottrell v. Faubus, 233 Ark. 721, 347 S.W.2d 52 (1961).
70. See Constitutional Defense League v. Waters, 309 Pa. 545, 164 A. 613 (1933).
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tended to be interpreted differently. If there was a necessity for a
provision applicable specifically to supplementary appropriation bills,
it defeats the purpose of such a special provision to construe it in the
same fashion as the general one-subject provision. Because of the
importance of appropriation bills and the special dangers of logrolling
inherent in such bills, the courts would be on a sounder basis if the
special provisions were construed more restrictively than the general
one-subject provisions. A different result has been reached in those
states which use different terms in the two constitutional provisions,"'
in spite of the fact that the words "object" and "subject" have been
construed as synonymous when used in general one-subject provisions. 2
In Panitz, for example, the Court of Appeals of Maryland concluded
that the terms "subject" and "object" as used in the two provisions
should be accorded different meanings. The court stated that the word
"object" has often been equated with the word "purpose," and is to
be given a more restricted meaning than "subject":
We find no incongruity in giving the "single object" requisites
of § 52(8) (a) a much more restricted meaning than the "one
subject" requirement of § 29. The construction and effect of § 29
which we have just discussed had long been established when
the framers proposed and the voters ratified the single object
doctrine of § 52(8). If it had been intended that § 52(8) was
to mean what § 29 had been held and was generally understood
to mean, certainly the same words of § 29 that already had been
construed would have been repeated in § 52. They were not, and
other words were substituted to insure, we believe in light of the
evil to be corrected and the result sought, that § 52(8) would be
given a much narrower and more restricted meaning than had
been given § 29.73
71. E.g., State ex rel. Jensen v. Kelly, 65 S.D. 345, 274 N.W. 319 (1937).
72. See Rudd, No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject, 42 MINN. L. Rzv.
389 (1958).
73. 247 Md. 512, 232 A.2d at 897. Following similar reasoning, the court in
State ex rel. Jensen v. Kelly, 65 S.D. 345, 274 N.W. 319, 323 (1937), reached the
same conclusion:
"In some of the state constitutions the word 'object' has been used instead of
'subject.' In the construction of this clause the courts have used the words
synonomous [sic] ; which, strictly speaking, is not so. The 'subject' of a statute
is the matter of public or private concern for which the law is enacted; the object
is the aim or purpose of the enactment." . . . It may be presumed that the
framers of the Constitution had some reason for using different words in these
closely related sections. Considering the matters with which the constitutional
provision deals, we believe the word "object" is used in the sense of purpose.
The West Virginia Constitution contains the identical "single work, object or
purpose" provision as the Maryland Constitution. W. VA. CoNST. art. VI, § 51 (c) (1).
While the West Virginia general one-subject provision, W. VA. CONST. art. VI,
§ 30, employs the term "object" rather than "subject" as in the Maryland Constitution,
this apparently would not influence the manner in which the West Virginia courts
would interpret the "single work, object or purpose" provision, as the courts of that
state have indicated that the general one-object provision is not applicable to supple-
mentary appropriation bills. State ex rel. Key v. Bond, 94 W. Va. 255, 118 S.E. 276
(1923). The West Virginia court has not decided the specific question involved in
Panitz. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has stated, however, that
since its budget amendment was based upon that passed earlier in Maryland, it would
[VOL. XXVIII
1968] PANITZ V. COMPTROLLER, FERGUSON V. GOLDSTEIN 407
Thus, while a Maryland supplementary appropriation bill may be
found to. satisfy the requirements of Article III, Section 29, the
"general one-subject" provision, it may not be sufficient to satisfy the
more stringent requirements of Article III, Section 52(8) (a), the
"single work, object or purpose" provision.
An examination of case law construing single subject or object
provisions applicable to supplementary appropriation bills discloses
that the courts use several techniques to justify their conclusion that
an act contains but one subject or object. 4 A frequently used tech-
nique is to determine whether an act has a unified purpose, and if it
does, to uphold the constitutionality of the act even though the methods
specified to accomplish that purpose vary."° A second technique is to
uphold as properly included in a supplementary appropriation bill
matters which are clearly "incidental" to or explanatory of a particular
appropriation. 6 The most frequently encountered technique is to
permit the inclusion of matters which are "germane" to the general
subject of the bill: "It is only such matters as are foreign, not related
to, nor connected with such subject, that are forbidden. Matters which
are germane to and naturally and logically connected with the expendi-
ture of the moneys provided in the bill, being in the nature of detail,
may be incorporated therein. '7 7 These techniques are, in fact, result-
oriented. If the court decides to hold that the act in question contains
but one subject or object, then one of the above techniques can be
regard as most persuasive two decisions of the Court of Appeals of Maryland inter-
preting the budget amendment. See State ex rel. Trent v. Sims, 138 W. Va. 244,
77 S.E.2d 122 (1953). The two Maryland cases cited as persuasive are Mayor &
City Council v. O'Connor, 147 Md. 639, 128 A. 759 (1925), and Dorsey v. Petrott,
178 Md. 230, 13 A.2d 630 (1940). Dorsey discusses Section 52 and interprets its
purpose, as does the court in Panitz. While it cannot be stated with absolute certainty,
it would seem reasonable to conclude that the West Virginia court would also find
the reasoning in Panitz persuasive, and would adopt a similar interpretation.
74. To a large extent these techniques are carried over from the interpretation
accorded the general one-subject provision. See 1 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CON-
STRUCTION § 1711 (1943 & Supp. 1968). See also Norton v. Lusk, 248 Ala. 110, 26 So.
2d 849 (1946) ; State ex rel. Davidson v. Ford, 115 Mont. 165, 141 P.2d 373 (1943);
State ex rel. Lucero v. Marron, 17 N.M. 304, 128 P. 485 (1912) ; State ex ret.
Gaulke v. Turner, 37 N.D. 635, 164 N.W. 924 (1917).
75. Horack, Constitutional Limitations on Legislative Procedure in West Virginia,
39 W. VA. L.Q. 294 (1933). The author suggests that perhaps the test is "What does
the act intend to accomplish; not how does the act intend to accomplish it." Id. at 304.
76. Norton v. Lusk, 248 Ala. 110, 26 So. 2d 849 (1946); Sellers v. Frohmiller,
42 Ariz. 239, 24 P.2d 666 (1933). Illustrative of what courts consider as "incidental"
is the case of State ex rel. Gaulke v. Turner, 37 N.D. 635, 164 N.W. 924 (1917).
Plaintiff, an operator of a public elevator and warehouse, was arrested for failure to
possess a license as required by law. He contended that the act under which he was
charged violated the constitutional requirement that supplementary appropriation bills
shall embrace but one subject. The act involved provided for the appointment of a
state inspector of grades, weights and measures, established the requirement that
public elevator operators obtain licenses, and appropriated $10,000 to put the law into
effect. Plaintiff contended that the act was unconstitutional because in addition to the
provisions for the grading and inspecting of agricultural products, it provided for an
appropriation. However, the court held that the act embraced but one subject - the
marketing of agricultural products - and that all else was incidental thereto.
77. State ex rel. Whittier v. Safford, 28 N.M. 531, 214 P. 759, 760 (1923).
"'Germane' is defined as meaning in close relationship, appropriate, relevant, or
pertinent to the general subject. . . ." I J. SUTHZRLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 1711 (1943).
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used to justify the inclusion of numerous provisions in the act. While
such techniques permit a degree of flexibility, they do not provide
precise guidelines for the determination of what constitutes a single
subject or object.
A RATIONALE FOR Panitz AND Ferguson:
THE EXECUTIVE-INITIATED MARYLAND BUDGET SCHEME
In Panitz v. Comptroller, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
reached a result which would certainly not have occurred in most
cther states. In those states with only a general one-subject provision,
the Cooper-Hughes bill would doubtless have been upheld as embracing
but one subject, since general one-subject provisions are liberally con-
strued. If an act similar to the one involved in Panitz were to be
challenged in states with one-subject or object provisions applicable
to supplementary appropriation bills, its fate would largely be deter-
mined by the wording of the provision under which it was construed.
In the majority of such states it would not fall within the one-subject
clause at all, or, if it did, it would be construed, under the liberal in-
terpretation usually accorded such provisions, as satisfying the one-
subject requirement. The issue would not even be certain under Cali-
fornia's restrictive clause,- for it is entirely possible that the anticipated
revenue could be construed as one "item" of appropriation, having
the single purpose of aid to political subdivisions.
While the Maryland Court of Appeals in Panitz found the pro-
posed Cooper-Hughes Act to be an obvious "logrolling" appropria-
tion bill,7" and chose to hinge its decision on a strict reading of the
"single work, object or purpose" provision, this does not explain why
the Maryland provision should be interpreted more stringently than
comparable provisions in other states. However, one explanation of
why the court in Panitz invalidated the Cooper-Hughes legislation
may be found by examining Maryland's appropriation scheme. The
requirement that supplementary appropriation bills contain some single
work, object or purpose was, in large part, intended to limit the scope
of such bills to purposes which are not of such overriding significance
that they should, of necessity, be included in the executive budget. An
appropriation bill of such magnitude and widespread impact as the
Cooper-Hughes Act is of such significance that it should be considered
as part of the budget and not be left to legislative initiation.79 The
78. 247 Md. at 515-16, 232 A.2d at 899:
[I]f the framers [of Section 52, Article III] had chosen to illumine their report
and recommendation with a classic example of the evils to be cured by the single
purpose prescription they might well have thought of and used as such an example
the conglomerate that is Ch. 142 of the Laws of 1967 [the Cooper-Hughes Act] -
with much smaller numbers of course.
79. Brief for Appellants at 9-10, Panitz v. Comptroller, 247 Md. 501, 232 A.2d
891 (1967):
It is clear that the framers of the budget amendment were primarily concerned
with preventing just such omnibus bills in aid of local subdivisions. In leaving
some scope for supplementary appropriation bills the framers of the amendment
made clear that such bills would serve only limited purposes.
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Court of Appeals could not but be impressed with the policy issue
implicit in the passage of the Cooper-Hughes Act. The executive-
initiated scheme of the Maryland budget provisions would appear to
require that omnibus appropriation bills, such as the Cooper-Hughes
bill, either be enacted as separate bills, each embracing some single
work, object or purpose, or as part of the Governor's budget bill. Thus,
the Panitz decision was perfectly consistent with the budgetary scheme
contemplated by the Maryland Constitution.
Whether the Maryland budget scheme required the result reached
in Ferguson, however, is not clear. Panitz indicated that the enact-
ment of supplementary appropriation bills will be scrutinized in light
of the executive initiative inherent in the budget provisions. Ferguson
extended the applicability of the "single work, object or purpose"
provision one step further, and placed yet another restriction on the
power of the General Assembly to enact supplementary appropriation
bills. If the decision in Ferguson is correct, the General Assembly
cannot by-pass the requirement that supplementary appropriation bills
be limited to "some single work, object or purpose" by enacting an
emergency appropriation bill at a special session of the legislature.
On its face, the reasoning of the court in Ferguson is sound.
However, the court failed to address itself to several difficult questions
raised by the defendants. While the court may have been correct in
its conclusion, based on the reasoning that there are only two possible
types of appropriations specified in Section 52(2) of Article 111,80 it
failed to resolve the issue of why an emergency appropriation under
Section 52(14)81 should be required to conform to the requirements
of Section 52(8) but not to the other provisions of Section 52.82 It is
a question of construction whether the emergency appropriation pro-
vision should be divorced from the rest of the budget section as con-
tended by defendants. The Circuit Court for Montgomery County
ruled that it should not be so construed, but did not meet defendant's
argument that:
The per curiam Order in Panitz, expressly relieving the General
Assembly from any obligation to impose a tax to raise the money
80. Budget bills and supplementary appropriation bills.
81. MD. CONST. art. III, § 52(14) : ". . . nothing [in § 52] shall in any manner...
be construed as preventing the Governor from calling extraordinary sessions of the
General Assembly, as provided by Section 16 of Article II, or as preventing the
General Assembly at such . . . sessions from considering any emergency appropria-
tion or appropriations."
82. While the Circuit Court for Montgomery County held that an emergency
appropriation bill must also meet the requirements of "some single work, object or
purpose," it failed to discuss whether an emergency appropriation bill must meet the
requirement that it be supported by a tax and that the bill be passed in each house
by a majority vote. Memorandum in Support of Demurrer of Defendants at 4,
Ferguson v. Goldstein, No. 23196 (Cir. Ct., Montgomery Co., July 9, 1968) :
Under subsection (8) a supplementary appropriation bill is subject to four distinct
criteria: (1) that it be embodied in a separate bill which is (2) limited to some
single work, object or purpose therein stated, (3) be supported by a tax provided
in the same bill and (4) be passed in each house by a vote of a majority of the
whole number of the members elected. If Senate Bill 1 were subject at all to
Section 52(8), then it would be subject to each of the terms set forth above.
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needed to support such an appropriation, recognizes the legal
fact that emergency appropriations under Section 52(14) are not
"supplementary appropriations" under Section 52(8) and, there-
fore, do not come under the formal requirements of the latter.8 s
The court, in Ferguson, was apparently struck by the incongruous
situation which would result if the emergency appropriation were
upheld. If the court had approved the emergency measure, it would
have condoned the passage of a bill, identical to that which was found
to be inconsistent with the state budgetary scheme in Panitz, merely
because the bill was passed by the same legislature sitting under
different circumstances. Ostensibly, the court would be permitting the
legislature to circumvent the system of executive initiated appropria-
tion simply by passing an otherwise unconstitutional supplementary
appropriation bill during a special session. Such a conclusion, how-
ever, is misleading. An emergency appropriation bill can be passed
only by a special session of the legislature ;84 a special session may be
convened only by the Governor. 5 If the emergency appropriation is
of such vital importance that the Governor feels compelled to initiate
a special session of the legislature to enact it, the danger of an intrusion
upon the budgetary prerogative of the executive, which is the justifica-
tion for the "single work, object or purpose" clause, is not present; the
Governor is necessarily aware of and accountable for measures passed
at a special session. For this reason, emergency appropriation bills
should not be subject to the restrictions of the "single work, object or
purpose" clause.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals in Panitz had ample reason to invalidate
the Cooper-Hughes Act, an obvious attempt at logrolling, as an un-
constitutional supplementary appropriation bill. While in most other
states such an act would very likely have been upheld as embracing
only one subject, it must be remembered that most states, unlike Mary-
land, do not constitutionally provide for a comprehensive executive-
oriented budget process. In most states the only restriction on supple-
mentary appropriation bills is that they embrace one subject. The
constitutions of these states do not demonstrate, in the same manner
as the Maryland Constitution, a policy of executive initiative in the
budgetary process. The decision in Panitz indicates that two factors
led to invalidation of the Cooper-Hughes Act: the patent "logrolling"
aspect of the act, and the underlying tacit understanding that the act
was an attempted legislative usurpation of executive responsibility for
fiscal policies under the terms of the budget amendment. An indis-
83. Id. at 11.
84. MD. CONSr. art. II, § 16, gives the Governor the power to convene the
legislature on extraordinary occasions. MD. CONST. art. III, § 14, declares that the
General Assembly shall convene on a specific day each year "unless convened by
proclamation of the Governor."
85. MD. CONST. art. III, § 52(14).
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criminate application of the "single work, object or purpose" require-
ment led to the decision in Ferguson. The court could have reached
a different conclusion had it remembered that a special session of the
legislature is initiated and controlled by the Governor and had it,
accordingly, chosen to interpret Section 52(14) as being free from the
requirements of Section 52(8). It did not choose to do so, and only
a future Court of Appeals decision will determine which construction
should obtain. In the meantime, it appears from Ferguson that any
appropriation other than the budget bill must be limited to "some single
work, object or purpose."
19681
